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ABSTRACT
Thirty years ago, Congress passed the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
("CFAA ") to combat the emerging problem of computer crime. The statute's
core prohibitions targeted one who "accesses" a computer "without authoriza-
tion" or who "exceeds authorized access." Over time, the incremental statu-
tory changes and large-scale technological changes have dramatically
expanded the potential scope of the CFAA. The question of what constitutes
unauthorized access has taken on far greater significance than it had thirty
years ago, and courts remain deeply divided on this question. This Article
explores the text, purpose, and history of the CFAA, as well as a range of
normative considerations that should guide interpretation of the statute. This
Article concludes that courts should pursue a narrow and "code-based" un-
derstanding of unauthorized access under the CFAA-both in terms of what it
means to access a computer without authorization and in terms of what it
means to exceed authorized access. The CFAA has strayed far from its origi-
nal purpose: Congress failed to define key terms in the CFAA, and courts
have overlooked limiting principles within the statute. From a normative per-
spective, even if it is desirable to provide owners of networked computer sys-
tems with stronger legal protection for their systems, the CFAA's
unauthorized access provisions are not the proper vehicle for doing so.
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INTRODUCTION
More than thirty years ago, to "stem the tide of criminal behav-
ior" involving the abuse of computer technology,' Congress adopted
the first federal statute specifically addressing computer crime. The
statute, the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1984,2 was quite narrow: it protected national security
information, information in financial records, and computers used by
or on behalf of the U.S. government.3 Within that narrow sphere, the
statute introduced a core concept of unauthorized access, encompass-
ing "access[ing] a computer without authorization" or using author-
ized access for purposes to which it does not extend.4 Beginning with
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 ("CFAA"), 5 Congress
amended the statute on several occasions, to reach a greater number
of computers and to add civil liability. With each amendment, how-
ever, the concept of unauthorized access-"access[ing]" a computer
"without authorization" or, in some contexts, "exceed[ing] authorized
access"-remained the trigger for nearly all of the statute's substan-
tive provisions.6
Despite the fact that what is now known as the CFAA has always
encompassed unauthorized access offenses, courts remain deeply di-
vided on what it means to access a computer without authorization or
to exceed authorized access. The ubiquity of computer technology,
coupled with the fact that the CFAA now reaches virtually any in-
ternet-connected computer, makes the CFAA an increasingly attrac-
tive tool for combating a range of inappropriate behavior. The
1 H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 4 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3690.
2 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 1873, 2190-91.
3 Id.
4 Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. II 1985)).
5 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213-16
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)).
6 Id.
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government and civil litigants alike have invoked the CFAA to target
employee disloyalty, unfair competition, the use of confidential infor-
mation for personal purposes, and even online bullying.
These far-ranging applications of the CFAA raise difficult doctri-
nal and normative questions. This Article explores the text, purpose,
and history of the CFAA, as well as a range of normative considera-
tions that should guide interpretation of the statute, and concludes
that courts should pursue a narrow and "code-based" understanding
of unauthorized access under the CFAA-both in terms of what it
means to access a computer without authorization and in terms of
what it means to exceed authorized access. Congress failed to define
key terms in the CFAA. The combination of incremental statutory
changes and dramatic technological changes creates the potential for
the CFAA to reach far beyond its original purpose. Courts have over-
looked limiting principles within the statute itself. From a normative
perspective, moreover, even if it is desirable to provide owners of
networked computer systems with stronger legal protection for their
systems, the CFAA's unauthorized access provisions are not the right
vehicle for doing so.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by describing five
paradigms of unauthorized access that existing cases reflect. Part II
explores the text, purpose, and history of the CFAA for clues about
how to interpret the statute. The discussion demonstrates how the
CFAA has strayed far from its original purpose, as the interplay of
incremental statutory modifications and dramatic changes in technol-
ogy has swept virtually all internet-connected devices within the stat-
ute's reach. The question of what it means to access a computer
without authorization or to exceed authorized access has far greater
significance than it did thirty years ago. Part III examines the relevant
normative considerations, both as they bear upon the question of stat-
utory interpretation and as they bear upon how Congress might
reshape the CFAA.
I. PARADIGMS OF UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS
As noted above, the CFAA currently encompasses two forms of
unauthorized access to a computer: "access[ing]" a computer "without
authorization" and "exceed[ing] authorized access."7 The statute does
7 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (2012) ("having knowingly accessed a computer without authori-
zation or exceeding authorized access"); id. § 1030(a)(2) ("intentionally accesses a computer
without authorization or exceeds authorized access"); id. § 1030(a)(3) ("intentionally, without
authorization to access . . . [certain computers], accesses such a computer"); id § 1030(a)(4)
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not define what it means to "access[]" a computer or what it means to
do so "without authorization." The statute defines the phrase "ex-
ceeds authorized access"8 as follows: "[T]o access a computer with au-
thorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter."9
Courts have long struggled to apply these concepts of accessing a
computer without authorization and exceeding authorized access. In-
deed, the caselaw reflects at least five different interpretive para-
digms.'0 This Part explores those five paradigms, with a few important
caveats. First, the goal of this analysis is purely descriptive; it seeks to
call attention to courts' varied approaches without (yet) passing on
which fits best with the statute. Second, the descriptive labels below
do not necessarily align with those that courts attach. Many courts
summarizing the caselaw refer only to two different approaches-
"broad" and "narrow."" As will become clear, the matter is far more
("knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or
exceeds authorized access"); id. § 1030(a)(5)(B) ("intentionally accesses a protected computer
without authorization"); id. § 1030(a)(5)(C) ("intentionally accesses a protected computer with-
out authorization").
8 Congress first adopted the phrase "exceeds authorized access" in 1986, replacing the
more cumbersome original language covering one who "uses the opportunity such access [with
authorization] provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend." Compare 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. II 1985), with 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(1)-(2), (4) (Supp. IV 1987)
(codifying the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat.
1213-16).
9 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
10 For other efforts to synthesize the unauthorized access caselaw, see, e.g., Orin S. Kerr,
Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and "Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1596, 1624-40 (2003); Samantha Jensen, Comment, Abusing the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act: Why Broad Interpretations of the CFAA Fail, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 102-14
(2013); Katherine Mesenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code or Contract: Determining Employees'
Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MicH. L. REv. 819, 822-29 (2009);
Kelsey T. Patterson, Note, Narrowing It Down to One Narrow View: Clarifying and Limiting the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 489, 497-513 (2013); David J. Rosen,
Note, Limiting Employee Liability Under the CFAA: A Code-Based Approach to "Exceeds Au-
thorized Access", 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 737, 746-59 (2012).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Steele, 595 F. App'x 208, 211 (4th Cir. 2014) (describing
"broad view" and "narrower construction"); LivePerson, Inc. v. 24/7 Customer, Inc., 83 F. Supp.
3d 501, 512-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (characterizing cases as narrow or broad); Aquent LLC v. Sta-
pleton, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1339, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (describing narrow and broad interpreta-
tions); Amphenol Corp. v. Paul, 993 F. Supp. 2d 100, 110 (D. Conn. 2014) (discussing trend
toward narrow approach); Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 615 (E.D. Pa. 2013)
(describing "split between what is cast as a broad versus a narrow interpretation"); Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc. v. Feldstein, 951 F. Supp. 2d 212, 217 (D. Mass. 2013) (describing broader
and narrower interpretations); JBCHoldings NY, LLC v. Pakter, 931 F. Supp. 2d 514, 521-22
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing "broad construction" and "narrow approach"); Ajuba Int'l, L.L.C.
v. Saharia, 871 F. Supp. 2d 671, 686 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (describing narrow and broad construc-
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complicated. Third, the differences between some of the paradigms
are subtle, and classifying a decision in one way or another may de-
pend on one critical fact that a court relied on or ignored. Even if
courts or commentators would disagree with how the analysis below
classifies individual decisions, however, the goal is to offer a taxonomy
that will press courts and commentators to think more carefully about
what constitutes unauthorized access.
A. Agency Paradigm
Under the agency paradigm, the boundaries of permissible access
to a computer covered by the CFAA depend upon principles of
agency law. This approach typically arises in cases involving disputes
between an employer and a disloyal (former) employee who uses in-
formation from the employer's computer system to compete with the
employer. In the influential decision of International Airport Centers,
LLC v. Citrin,'12 for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit adopted an agency approach to reverse the dismissal of a
claim that a former employee acted without authorization when he
deleted files from his company-owned laptop.13
In Citrin, a group of real estate companies had hired the defen-
dant to identify properties to purchase and had provided the defen-
dant with a company-owned laptop for that purpose.14 After the
defendant decided to start a competing business, he allegedly used a
secure-erasure program to delete from the laptop both company data
and information that could have revealed that he violated his employ-
ment contract.15 The employer claimed, among other things, that the
defendant violated what is now § 1030(a)(5)(B) of the CFAA, which
reaches one who "intentionally accesses a protected computer without
authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes dam-
tions of the CFAA); Orbit One Commc'ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 373, 385
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (adopting "narrow" reading of the CFAA); Guest-Tek Interactive Entm't, Inc.
v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42, 46 (D. Mass. 2009) (describing parties as urging broad and narrow
interpretations); NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1058 (S.D. Iowa 2009)
(describing and adopting "broad" view of statutory language and legislative history); State Anal-
ysis, Inc. v. Am. Fin. Servs. Assoc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 309, 315 (E.D. Va. 2009) (noting that courts
have differed "as to how broadly or narrowly" to construe the statute).
12 Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
13 Id. at 420-21. The Seventh Circuit relied heavily on the district court decision in Shur-
gard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash.
2000).
14 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419.
15 Id. at 419-21.
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age."1 6 The defendant's use of the secure-erasure program was "with-
out authorization," the court reasoned, because the defendant's
"breach of his duty of loyalty terminated his agency relationship" with
his employer and the agency relationship was "the only basis of his
authority" to access the laptop.17 In other words, when the defendant
engaged in disloyal conduct, he lost any authority to access the laptop,
making any further access (in this case, to erase the laptop's contents)
"without authorization" for purposes of the CFAA.18
In siding with the employer and concluding that the defendant
accessed the laptop without authorization, the Seventh Circuit did not
base its conclusion that the defendant lacked authorization on the vio-
lation of any term of the defendant's employment contract or of a
company policy constraining the defendant's access to the laptop or
his authority to delete files from it.19 The court stated only that the
defendant breached his duty of loyalty and his employment contract
by going into competition with his employer.2 0 The case thus suggests
that even in the absence of specific contractual restrictions on access
to a protected computer, a court can import freestanding agency prin-
ciples to set the boundaries of permissible access under the CFAA.
Several district courts have followed the Citrin court's approach.21
B. Norms-of-Access Paradigm
Under the norms-of-access paradigm, the limits of permissible ac-
cess under the CFAA turn on certain shared understandings of or rea-
sonable expectations about how far access to a covered computer
should extend. Although it is possible to interpret certain employee
loyalty cases as applying a norms-of-access paradigm, the paradigm is
16 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B) (2012). Between 2001 and 2008, the quoted language ap-
peared at § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i). See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 814(a)(1)-(3), 115 Stat. 272, 382-83
(2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)); Pub. L. No. 110-326, § 204(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3650,
3561-63 (2008) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). To avoid confusion and facilitate compari-
son of similar cases, this Article uses the current section numbers.
17 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419-21.
18 Id.
19 In fact, the employment contract permitted Citrin to "return or destroy" data in the
laptop. Id. at 421.
20 Id. at 420.
21 See, e.g., Ryan, LLC v. Evans, No. 8:12-CV-289-T-30TBM, 2012 WL 1551285 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 30, 2012); Amedisys Holding, LLC v. Interim Healthcare of Atlanta, Inc., 793 F. Supp.
2d 1302, 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2011); NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1061 (S.D.
Iowa 2009); ViChip Corp. v. Lee, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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perhaps best understood through the lens of an early case involving a
criminal prosecution, United States v. Morris.22
Morris, a graduate student in computer science at Cornell Uni-
versity, created a "worm" that exploited security flaws in certain pro-
grams that allowed users to transmit or retrieve information from
internet-connected computers.2 3 Morris claimed that he developed
the worm to expose internet security weaknesses.24 He launched the
worm from a computer at MIT and it replicated more quickly than
anticipated, thereby slowing or damaging a number of computers.25
The version of the CFAA in effect in 1988, when Morris's conduct
occurred, did not contain what is now § 1030(a)(5)(A), which prohib-
its intentionally causing "damage without authorization" through "the
knowing transmission of a program, information, code, or com-
mand."2 6 Because the CFAA lacked a provision specifically covering
the transmission of potentially harmful code, Morris's conduct could
violate the CFAA only if it fit within a provision covering one who
"intentionally accesses" a covered computer "without authorization"
and thereby "alters, damages, or destroys information" or "prevents
authorized use of any such computer or information."27
Morris appealed his jury conviction, and the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit had to confront whether Morris's trans-
mission of the worm constituted "intentionally access[ing]" a
computer "without authorization."28 Morris claimed that the pro-
grams the worm exploited-"sendmail" and "finger demon" pro-
grams-were programs that he had authorization to access at the
various institutions affected.29 At most, he argued, his conduct could
constitute exceeding authorized access, which the provision in ques-
tion did not cover.30 The court rejected this argument on the ground
that Morris did not use the sendmail and finger demon functions "in
any way related to their intended function . . . . He did not send or
read mail nor discover information about other users; instead he
22 United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 511 (2d Cir. 1991).
23 Id. at 505.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 506.
26 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (2012).
27 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (Supp. V 1988).
28 Morris, 928 F.2d at 505.
29 Id. at 506.
30 Id. at 509-10; see 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (Supp. V 1988).
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found holes in both programs that permitted him a special and unau-
thorized access route into other computers."31
In focusing on the programs' "intended function," the court
sought to arrive at some understanding of what would constitute ap-
propriate use of the technology in question.32 The court did not ex-
amine Morris's conduct through the lens of any agency relationship
created by Morris's status as a computer science graduate student.33
Nor did the court rely on specific policies or contractual terms that
constrained Morris's access to the affected computers or the technol-
ogy Morris exploited.34 Rather, the court developed a concept of au-
thorized access based on its understanding of how one ought to use
the technology in question.
In employee loyalty cases, courts have likewise focused on how a
particular computer system ought to be used. An early federal district
court case involving a former employee's alleged misappropriation of
confidential information is illustrative of a norm-based approach, al-
though one that the court of appeals ultimately rejected.35 Former
employees of EF Cultural Travel, a company that designed and mar-
keted student ours, formed a competing tour company called Explor-
ica.3 6 Explorica hired a technology consultant to design a program to
"scrape" pricing information from EF's website, so that Explorica
could attempt to undercut EF's prices.37 The scraper relied on certain
proprietary tour codes that were publicly available on EF's website,
but that were not readily understandable to the general public.38
The district court held that Explorica violated § 1030(a)(4) of the
CFAA, which prohibits one from "knowingly and with intent to de-
fraud, access[ing] a protected computer without authorization, or ex-
ceed[ing] authorized access, and by means of such conduct
further[ing] the intended fraud and obtain[ing] anything of value." 39
The district court held that the scope of Explorica's authorization to
use EF's website should depend on whether the conduct was "'in line
31 Morris, 928 F.2d at 510 (emphasis added).
32 See id. at 509-10.
33 See id.
34 See id. at 510.
35 The district court opinion is unpublished, but is described in EF Cultural Travel BV v.
Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582 n.10 (1st Cir. 2001) and EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corpo-
ration, 318 F.3d 58, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2003).
36 Zefer, 318 F.3d at 60.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2012).
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with the 'reasonable expectations' of the website owner and its ordi-
nary users."4 0 Although EF's website did not specifically address the
use of scrapers, the district court concluded that Explorica's use of the
scraper was inconsistent with reasonable expectations for use of its
site.41
Like the Morris court, the Explorica district court thus attempted
to arrive at an understanding of how the computer in question-in
this case, a publicly available web server-ought to be used. The po-
tential breadth of the district court's approach was not lost on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which first cast doubt on the
"reasonable expectations" test4 2 and then rejected i In an appeal
involving Explorica and its founders, the court found it unnecessary to
rule on the district court's "reasonable expectations" test, because it
identified an alternative basis for concluding that Explorica's scraper
exceeded authorized access under the CFAA: the former employee
was subject to a confidentiality agreement that restricted use of pro-
prietary information "which might reasonably be construed to be con-
trary to the interests of EF."44 Although the confidentiality
agreement in no way addressed the terms of permissible access to
EF's website, the court implied that, by virtue of the agreement, the
former employee ought to have known that the manner in which he
accessed the website was improper.45 In a subsequent case involving
the developer of the scraper-who was not subject to the confidential-
ity agreement and whose authority to access the website therefore
could not turn on that agreement-the court of appeals rejected the
"reasonable expectations" test, suggesting that the lack of common
understanding underpinning the notion of reasonable expectations in
this context would place users "at the mercy of a highly imprecise,
litigation-spawning standard."46 Despite the First Circuit's rejection
of the district court's approach, other courts have invoked similar con-
40 Explorica, 274 F.3d at 582 n.10 (quoting district court opinion); see also id. at 580
(describing district court as holding that EF would likely prove that Explorica used its website
"in a manner outside the 'reasonable expectations' of both EF and its ordinary users") (quoting
district court opinion).
41 See Zefer, 318 F.3d at 62.
42 Explorica, 274 F.3d at 582 n.10.
43 Zefer, 318 F.3d at 63.
44 Explorica, 274 F.3d at 583.
45 See infra Section I.C.
46 Zefer, 318 F.3d at 61, 63. The court nevertheless ustained the injunction against the
developer of the scraper, on the ground that any use of the scraper would assist Explorica in
violating the injunction to which it was subject. Id.
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cepts of intended use or reasonable expectations in interpreting the
CFAA.47
C. Policy Paradigm
Under the policy paradigm, whether access to a computer is un-
authorized for purposes of the CFAA turns on whether the owner of a
computer system has a policy designed to notify users of the bounda-
ries of permitted access.48 Under the policy approach, one who vio-
lates the stated limitations on access is acting without or in excess of
authorization. The breadth of the CFAA under this approach de-
pends on (1) how the system owner notifies users of its policy, and
(2) what sort of limitations qualify as limitations on access.
To bring these two issues into focus, consider two quite different
categories of cases in which CFAA claims arise. The first category
involves a company that provides others with the opportunity to use
its computer system but that attempts to limit such access through an
acceptable use policy, terms of service, or similar mechanisms. The
provider's policy may preclude access to the system for certain pur-
poses, or it may preclude particular uses of the information the system
contains. Early CFAA cases in this category typically involve defend-
ants harvesting email addresses for the purpose of sending unsolicited
email49 or defendants using automated queries to extract information
from a rival website.50 The second category of cases involves situa-
tions in which an employer has a policy that restricts access to its com-
47 See, e.g., United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying "intended
use" analysis); United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2007) (adopting "expected
norms of intended use" analysis); Merritt Hawkins & Assocs., LLC v. Gresham, 79 F. Supp. 3d
625, 635 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (suggesting that deletion of certain files was beyond the "intended
use" of the system).
48 As will become clear, some providers seek to use such mechanisms to create a binding
contract with the user. The next Section discusses a contract-based paradigm. This Section uses
the label "policy" paradigm to describe situations in which a court does not consider the ques-
tions of notice and assent that would be necessary to treat the provider's terms as a binding
contract and situations in which a court considering those questions would find that no contract
exists.
49 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc. (Nat'l Health Care Disc. II),
174 F. Supp. 2d 890, 892 (N.D. Iowa 2001); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444,
446 (E.D. Va. 1998).
50 See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 579-81 (1st Cir. 2001);
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd as modified, 356
F.3d 393 (2nd Cir. 2004). For more recent automated query cases, see Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps
Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d
927, 930-31 (E.D. Va. 2010).
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puter system and an employee (or former employee) violates those
restrictions.51
The cases involving email harvesting provide a useful illustration
of the first issue concerning the reach of the CFAA: how a provider
must convey its policy before a court can determine that the policy
validly sets the boundaries of authorized access. Two early email
cases involve defendants who subscribed to America Online ("AOL")
for the purpose of harvesting the addresses of fellow AOL subscrib-
ers.5 2 AOL had a specific policy on unsolicited email as well as terms
of service that prohibited the use of AOL membership to harvest
email addresses.53 Based on the unsolicited email policy and the terms
of service, AOL successfully claimed that the harvesting of email ad-
dresses violated § 1030(a)(2)(C) of the CFAA, which prohibits one
from accessing a protected computer without authorization and
thereby obtaining information.54 In both cases, courts gave effect to
the policy on unsolicited email and the terms of service, without in-
quiring whether the defendants had actual or constructive knowledge
of the policy or terms (or had agreed to them).55 Because AOL sent
cease-and-desist letters and ultimately sued,56 one could argue that the
defendants had actual knowledge of AOL's objection to their conduct,
and the question of whether the policy statement or terms of service
put the defendants on notice of the limits of authorization was there-
fore irrelevant. Both cases, however, also involved damages for con-
duct that occurred prior to AOL's sending of the cease-and-desist
letters.57 Both courts concluded that it was appropriate to award dam-
ages and therefore necessarily relied on the policy and the terms of
service as the trigger for liability under the CFAA.58 In other words,
courts deemed the unsolicited email policy and terms of use sufficient
to render the defendants' access unauthorized.
51 See, e.g., John, 597 F.3d at 263; United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2010); Aquent LLC v. Stapleton, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1339, 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2014); United States
v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), affd in part, rev'd in part, 807 F.3d 508 (2nd Cir.
2015).
52 Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc. (Nat'l Health Care Disc. 1), 121 F.
Supp. 2d 1255, 1261 (N.D. Iowa 2000); LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 448.
53 Nat'! Health Care Disc. I, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1261; LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 448.
54 Nat'1 Health Care Disc. II, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 899; LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
55 See Nat'1 Health Care Disc. II, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 899; LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
56 Nat'1 Health Care Disc. I, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1265; LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 448.
57 Nat'! Health Care Disc. I, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1260-61; LGCM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 448.
58 Nat'! Health Care Disc. II, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 900-02; see LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 452
(noting that damages would be determined at trial).
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To explore the second issue, concerning what sorts of limitations
actually qualify as limitations on access, we can turn to the automated
query and employer database cases. For the most part, the CFAA
focuses on the act of accessing a computer. A key question that arises
when the system owner claims that a defendant's conduct violates the
CFAA is whether the system owner must show that the defendant
violated a policy governing access to the computer or whether it is
sufficient that the defendant violated a policy on use of information
obtained through the defendant's access to the computer. An auto-
mated query case is illustrative. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio59 involved
a domain name registrar.60 The entity that accredited the registrar,
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN"), required the registrar to maintain a database of informa-
tion about its registrants and to make that database available to the
public.61 Verio used a series of automated requests to extract informa-
tion about new registrants and then offered competing services to
those registrants.62 The registrar's system was publicly available, and
its terms of use did not purport to restrict automated queries to ex-
tract data from the system.63 The terms of use did, however, prohibit
the use of the publicly available data for purposes of sending unsolic-
ited email.M The district court concluded that the defendant's access
to the registrar's system violated § 1030(a)(2)(C)'s prohibition on
gaining unauthorized access to a computer and thereby obtaining in-
formation.65 The court reasoned that when Verio gained access to the
system, Verio knew that it would use the data it obtained for an unau-
thorized purpose.6 That fact, in the court's view, made Verio's initial
access to the system to acquire the data unauthorized.67 One could
argue that importing policy-based restrictions on use into the analysis
of what constitutes unauthorized access brings a court's approach
closer to a paradigm incorporating agency principles or norms of ac-
cess, because the court's approach validates access limitations drawn
from outside of the access policy itself.
59 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 356 F.3d 393
(2d Cir. 2004). The court of appeals did not address Register.com's CFAA claims.
60 Id. at 241.
61 Id. at 241-42.
62 Id. at 243.
63 Id. at 249 (noting, in the context of state law trespass-to-chattels claim, that terms of use
did not "forbid the particular use of the search robot at issue here").
64 Id. at 255.
65 Id. at 253.
66 Id. at 253-55.
67 Id. at 253.
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Several cases involving improper conduct by employees or for-
mer employees raise similar issues. It is (mainly) in this context that
courts have characterized their approaches to unauthorized access
under the CFAA as "broad" or "narrow." 68 Faced with claims that
employees or former employees have misused confidential informa-
tion that they were entitled to access, some courts have held that a
violation of the CFAA occurs only when a defendant violates a policy
on access to a computer, not when a defendant violates a policy on the
use of information that the defendant is authorized to obtain.69 The
courts in this group often characterize their approaches as reflecting a
"narrow" view of the CFAA. Other courts have held that a defen-
dant's knowledge that he or she will put information obtained from a
computer to an unauthorized use makes the access to the computer
unauthorized, even when the employer's policy does not specifically
constrain access to the system.70
The distinction between "access" restrictions and "use" restric-
tions, however, is not as crisply drawn as some courts might suggest.
Some courts have enforced restrictions on access that attempt to in-
corporate restrictions on use. For example, an employer may state
that its employees have access to a confidential database for a specific
purpose and that access to the database for any other purpose is not
permitted. The criminal prosecutions in United States v. Valle,71
United States v. Rodriguez,72 and United States v. John73 each fit this
paradigm. In each case, an employee had access to sensitive informa-
tion,74 but his or her access to that information was limited to a spe-
68 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
69 See, e.g., Advanced Fluid Sys., Inc. v. Huber, 28 F. Supp. 3d 306, 329 (M.D. Pa. 2014)
("[T]he CFAA prohibits unauthorized access to information rather than unauthorized use of
such information."); Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 620 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (noting
that corporate use restrictions could not alter employees' authorized access); State Analysis, Inc.
v. Am. Fin. Servs., Ass'n, 621 F. Supp. 2d 309, 317 (E.D. Va. 2009) (finding allegation that a
defendant had "used the information in an inappropriate way" insufficient to state a claim under
the CFAA); Diamond Power Int'l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2007)
("Defining 'authorization' based upon the use of computer information, rather than upon the
presence or absence of initial permission to access the computer, is in tension with both a plain
reading of the Act and the manner in which the term 'authorization' is used in other parts of the
Act.").
70 See, e.g., United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010); Aquent LLC v. Staple-
ton, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1339, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 2014).
71 United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
72 United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010).
73 John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
74 Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1258; John, 597 F.3d at 263; Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 53.
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cific business purpose.75  In each case, the employee obtained
information for other purposes. Courts found unauthorized access in
each case.76 It is unsurprising that courts in circuits taking a broad
approach would validate such access restrictions. Even some courts in
circuits that take a "narrow" view of unauthorized access, however,
will validate such restrictions, on the theory that the restriction is a
limitation on access rather than use. Under such an approach, liability
under the CFAA turns on whether an employer that seeks to restrict
its employees' use of confidential information happens to incorporate
the use restriction into its policy on access.77 The line between the
"broad" and "narrow" views becomes illusory.
D. Contract Paradigm
The contract paradigm is similar to the policy paradigm, except
that the contract paradigm encompasses cases in which a court focuses
on a contract as the source of restrictions on a user's access to a com-
puter system. As with the policy paradigm, a number of factors influ-
ence the scope of the CFAA under this approach, including how
carefully a court considers whether an enforceable contract exists and
whether the contract addresses access to the computer system or
merely use of the information the system contains.
The issue of enforceability presents difficult questions that recur
across a range of scenarios implicating technology. For example,
courts have wrestled with whether terms presented when a user
downloads software are enforceable. Building on "shrinkwrap"
cases-cases in which courts enforce licenses included in a box con-
taining software, so long as the consumer has a right to reject the
terms by returning the product78-courts have enforced "clickwrap"
75 Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1260 (noting that the Social Security Administration conditioned
access to its databases on use for a business purpose); John, 597 F.3d at 272 (noting that em-
ployee's use of information was "contrary to ... employee policies, of which she was aware");
Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 109 (noting that employee received training warning him that accessing
databases for non-work-related purposes was improper).
76 Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263 ("Rodriguez exceeded his authorized access and violated
the Act when he obtained personal information for a nonbusiness reason."); John, 597 F.3d at
271 (holding that authorized access "may encompass limits placed on the use of information
obtained by permitted access to a computer system and data available on that system"); Valle,
301 F.R.D. at 115 (noting that the defendant's access "was limited to circumstances in which he
had a valid law enforcement purpose for querying the system").
77 Cf Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 620 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (noting
"open question" of whether "a cleverly crafted employee use policy could define authorized
access on the basis of the user's intent").
78 See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
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or "click-through" licenses requiring users to click "I Agree" or "I
Accept" before downloading a software product.79 Courts ask in such
cases whether the user has reasonable notice of the existence of the
governing license terms and whether the "offer" makes clear that
clicking the button will signify assent to those terms. Those cases im-
ply that when the owner of a system sets forth terms of use and re-
quires the user to click a button before proceeding, the terms will be
enforceable." In cases specifically involving the CFAA, some courts
have held that when a user acknowledges limitations on access to a
computer system, access that goes beyond those limitations will trig-
ger a violation of the CFAA. 1 Other courts have found that a pro-
vider can restrict access to a system simply by including a term stating
that anyone who uses the system consents to the provider's terms of
use.82 When a court fails to fully consider difficult issues of notice and
assent, the contract paradigm collapses into the policy paradigm.83
As for restrictions on access versus restrictions on use, the con-
tract paradigm presents issues similar to the policy paradigm. First,
the "contract" the provider seeks to enforce may not address access to
the computer system at all.84 Again, such an approach begins to re-
semble an agency approach or a norms-of-access approach, under
which the court looks beyond any restrictions on access to the system
to determine what conduct is "authorized" for purposes of the
CFAA.85 In addition, a carefully worded access restriction can incor-
porate limitations on use, thereby collapsing the distinction between
supposedly "broad" and "narrow" approaches to access.86
79 See Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2243 n.315
(2004) (citing i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass.
2002); Forrest v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010-11 (D.C. 2002) (enforcing forum
selection clause where terms were displayed in scroll box and plaintiff subscriber clicked "Ac-
cept" button); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, LLC, 732 A.2d 528, 530-31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999); Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 293 A.D.2d 587 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Barnett v. Net-
work Sols., Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. App. 2001)).
80 See Bellia, supra note 79, at 2244.
81 See, e.g., United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
82 See Bellia, supra note 79 at 2244-45 (discussing such cases but noting the importance of
not overstating their holdings) (citing Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 396,
398-402 (2d Cir. 2004); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654 HLH(BQRX),
2000 WL 525390, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000)).
83 See id. at 2245.
84 See, e.g., Aquent LLC v. Stapleton, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1339, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (noting
that defendant signed an offer letter requiring that she "keep such information confidential dur-
ing [her] employment and at all times thereafter").
85 See supra Section IA, I.B.
86 See, e.g., United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1071 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding viola-
tion of CFAA where employee browsed tax returns of certain acquaintances, despite having
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E. Code Paradigm
Under the code paradigm, whether access to a computer is unau-
thorized depends upon whether an individual breaches a code-based
barrier to the system or to certain information on it. The Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Millers7 pro-
vides an example of how a code-based approach to unauthorized
access might operate. Miller, a former employee of WEC, allegedly
downloaded proprietary information before resigning his position.*8
He then went to work on behalf of a competitor and used the proprie-
tary information to make a presentation to a customer on behalf of
that competitor.89 WEC had policies limiting unauthorized use of its
proprietary information and forbidding the downloading of such in-
formation to a personal computer.90 WEC, relying on Citrin, claimed
that Miller had no authority to access its computers in a manner ad-
verse to its interests.91 The court rejected this approach, holding that
access "without authorization" occurs only when a defendant "gains
admission to a computer without approval,"9 2 and access in excess of
authorization occurs only when a defendant "uses his access to obtain
or alter information that falls outside the bounds of his approved ac-
cess."93 The court's understanding of what constituted "approved ac-
cess" depended not on the employer's policy on the downloading or
use of information, but on the fact that the information was accessible
in a technical sense to the defendant.94 Other cases take a similar ap-
proach, using the fact that a defendant is technically able to access the
information in question as the basis for holding that access is not
unauthorized.95
The difficulty with WEC and similar cases, however, is that they
involve situations in which an employee has technical access to a com-
puter system and the employer has no policy that speaks clearly to the
signed certain documents restricting his "access only [to] those accounts required to accomplish
your official duties").
87 WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012).
88 Id. at 200.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 202.
91 Id. at 203.
92 Id. at 204.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See, e.g., LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133-35 (9th Cir. 2009); Orbit
One Commc'ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 373, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Jet One
Group, Inc. v. Halcyon Jet Holdings, Inc., No. 08-CV-3980 (JS)(ETB), 2009 WL 2524864, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009).
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question of access. In other words, neither the system's code nor a
policy or contract incorporates restrictions on access. Thus, one could
interpret WEC in two ways. First, one could understand WEC to
mean that unauthorized access under the CFAA is triggered only by a
breach of code-based restrictions. Second, one could interpret WEC
to mean that an unauthorized access claim fails when an employer
does not somehow clearly convey the restrictions on access, whether
through code or otherwise. In other words, when an employer does
not have a policy, contract, or code-based restriction constraining ac-
cess, a court need not address what sort of limitations on access trigger
violations of the CFAA. The WEC court, for example, had no occa-
sion to say what it meant to gain admission to a computer "without
approval" or what it meant for information to "fall[] outside the
bounds of . .. approved access."96 As discussed above in connection
with the policy paradigm97 and the contract paradigm,98 a system pro-
vider might attempt to condition a user's "access" to the computer on
conduct in furtherance of the employer's interests or on the em-
ployee's intention to use the information in a manner consistent with
the employer's interests. WEC's failure to adopt a policy or contract
restricting access meant that the court did not need to grapple with
whether access for personal purposes or for purposes adverse to the
employer's interests would become access without or in excess of
authorization.
Courts' attempts to distinguish WEC and similar cases on the
grounds that such cases involved no restrictions on access raise the
possibility that there are no cases truly fitting the "code paradigm"-
that all courts would honor policies or contract terms that explicitly
restrict access short of the level of access that is possible as a technical
matter. Key language in many of the cases rejecting CFAA liability,
however, suggests that at least some courts would take a pure code-
based approach. WEC offered the example of an employee who uses
his computer in a manner contrary to a company access policy-for
example, to "check[] the latest Facebook posting or sporting event
scores."99 The court rejected the notion that Congress intended the
CFAA to treat such violations of company policy as unauthorized ac-
cess.10o The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit made a simi-
96 WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC, 687 F.3d at 204.
97 See supra Section I.B.
98 See supra Section I.C.
99 WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC, 687 F.3d at 206.
100 Id.
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lar point in its en banc decision in United States v. Nosal ("Nosal I"),101
a 2012 case rejecting the proposition that employees of an executive
search firm "exceed[ed] authorized access" when they downloaded
confidential information from a company database for an improper
purpose-to provide that information to Nosal, a former colleague
who had established a competing firm.rn2 The court observed that,
under what it described as a "broad" interpretation of the CFAA,
"minor dalliances" such as "g-chatting with friends, playing games,
shopping or watching sports highlights" in violation of an employer's
computer use policy would become federal crimes.103 Both WEC and
Nosal I suggested that use of a computer in a manner contrary to such
policies would not trigger liability under the CFAA's unauthorized ac-
cess provisions.104 Importantly, courts taking this position do not sug-
gest that the CFAA is inapplicable because employees might lack
notice of the restrictive use policy or might not have agreed to it.
Rather, they suggest hat the CFAA simply should not apply in such a
case.105 That view necessarily depends on the technical openness of
101 United States v. Nosal (Nosal 1), 676 F.3d 854, 860-61 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
102 Id. at 864 ("Because Nosal's accomplices had permission to access the company
database and obtain the information contained within, the government's charges fail to meet the
element of 'without authorization, or exceeds authorized access . . . .'). After the Ninth Circuit
dismissed the CFAA counts that had been based on Nosal's aiding and abetting the employees'
alleged misuse of the company's confidential database, the government filed a superseding in-
dictment alleging that once the employees left the executive search firm, they continued to ac-
cess the database at Nosal's behest through use of a then-current employee's password, and that
such access was "without authorization" under the CFAA. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Nosal's
conviction under the CFAA for aiding and abetting the former employees' conduct. United
States v. Nosal (Nosal Il), 828 F.3d 865, 880 (9th Cir. 2016).
103 Nosal I, 676 F.3d. at 860.
104 WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC, 687 F.3d at 206 ("Although an employer might
choose to rescind an employee's authorization for violating a use policy, we do not think Con-
gress intended an immediate end to the agency relationship and, moreover, the imposition of
criminal penalties for such a frolic."); Nosal 1, 676 F.3d at 862 ("We remain unpersuaded by the
decisions of our sister circuits that interpret the CFAA broadly to cover violations of corporate
computer use restrictions or violations of a duty of loyalty.").
There is undoubtedly some tension between Nosal I and Nosal II. See Nosal II, 828 F.3d at
894 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The latter case, however, did not purport to reject the former
case's holding that employees' use of a computer system for the improper purpose of download-
ing confidential information does not constitute "exceed[ing] authorized access." Id. at 869 (not-
ing that the case is not about "violating a company's internal computer-use policies").
105 See Univ. Sports Publ'ns Co. v. Playmakers Media Co., 725 F. Supp. 2d 378, 385
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that while violation of confidentiality agreements "might sustain a
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, or theft of trade secrets claim, it does not . . .
support a CFAA claim").
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the employer's system, even in the face of policies or contracts that
purport to restrict access.106
In sum, courts have struggled to resolve what constitutes unau-
thorized access to a computer system. Courts have fallen in line with
what they have characterized as "broad" or "narrow" views of the
CFAA. In fact, there are multiple fissures in the caselaw: between
courts adopting and rejecting the agency approach; between courts
validating and rejecting use limitations as the basis for finding unau-
thorized access; and between courts validating and questioning non-
technical limitations on access.
II. RETHINKING UNAUTHORIZED ACCESs: DOCTRINAL ISSUES
The difficulties that courts and commentators face in resolving
what constitutes unauthorized access under the CFAA stem in part
from the statute's incremental evolution in the face of a dramatically
shifting technological landscape. Before turning to the interpretive is-
sues, this Part summarizes that evolution-not to claim that the
CFAA reflects a single principle to guide the resolution of questions
of statutory interpretation, but to provide some context for the inter-
pretive discussion that follows.
A. Legislative Context: The Expansion of the CFAA
Congress first tackled computer crime in 1984, adopting the
Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as
part of a large appropriations and crime control measure.07 The stat-
ute covered one who "knowingly accesses a computer without author-
ization, or having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the
opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such authori-
zation does not extend,"08 and by means of such conduct achieves one
of three prohibited ends: (1) obtains national security information;109
(2) obtains information from a record of a financial institution or
106 See State Analysis, Inc. v. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n, 621 F. Supp. 2d 309, 316 (E.D. Va.
2009) (describing authorities as rejecting "attempts to apply the CFAA to cases where the de-
fendants are not alleged to have 'broken into' the system but to have abused the privileges of a
license"); cf Nosal II, 828 F.3d at 878 (rejecting the argument that the district court ought to
have instructed the jury "that the CFAA only criminalizes access where the party circumvents a
technological access barrier," but acknowledging that the former employees' use of another's
password in fact circumvented a technological barrier to access).
107 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, ch. 21, 98 Stat. 2190 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. II 1985)).
108 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. II 1985).
109 Id. § 1030(a)(1).
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credit reporting agency;110 or (3) "uses, modifies, destroys, or discloses
information in, or prevents authorized use of' a U.S. government
computer.11 The statute did not define what it meant to "access" a
computer or to have "authorization" to do so.
Two years later, in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986,112
Congress clarified the statute and expanded its reach. First, the
amendments substituted the phrase "exceeds authorized access"113 for
the more cumbersome concept of "us[ing] the opportunity" that ac-
cess with authorization provides "for purposes to which such authori-
zation does not extend." Congress retained the existing unauthorized
access offenses and added two new ones: in new § 1030(a)(4), unau-
thorized access with intent to defraud, by which one furthers the in-
tended fraud and obtains anything of value;114 and in new
§ 1030(a)(5), unauthorized access that "alters, damages, or destroys
information."lls Congress tied each of these offenses to a "[f]ederal
interest computer,"1 16 defined to include (1) computers used exclu-
sively or in part by a financial institution or the United States govern-
ment; and (2) "one of two or more computers used in committing the
offense, not all of which are located in the same State."117
Despite the introduction of the term "[flederal interest com-
puter," the scope of the CFAA remained fairly narrow. The first defi-
nition of a federal interest computer overlapped with the range of
computers covered in the original 1984 statute. Although the second
definition covered computers without a nexus to the federal govern-
ment or a financial institution, it required an interstate nexus: that the
offense involved multiple computers in an interstate computer net-
work or unauthorized access to a networked computer located in an-
other state. The state of technology and the realities of networking
thus circumscribed the statute's reach: the internet was not in wide-
spread use, and so the addition of provisions targeting interstate of-
fenses did not dramatically expand the statute's scope.
110 Id. § 1030(a)(2).
111 Id. § 1030(a)(3).
112 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified as
amended 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. V 1988)).
113 Id. § 2(c), 100 Stat. at 1213.
114 Id. § 2(d), 100 Stat. at 1213-14.
115 Id. § 2(d), 100 Stat. at 1214. Congress also added a third crime involving trafficking in a
"password or similar information through which a computer may be accessed without authoriza-
tion." Id.
116 Id. § 2(d), 100 Stat. at 1213-14.
117 Id. § 2(g)(4), 100 Stat. at 1215.
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Congress made two important changes to the CFAA in the Vio-
lent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,118 before sig-
nificantly revising the statute in 1996. First, Congress amended
§ 1030(a)(5), which had targeted one who accesses a federal interest
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access and
thereby "alters, damages, or destroys information."119 The 1994 ver-
sion of § 1030(a)(5) no longer required unauthorized access to a com-
puter, but instead focused on one who, "through means of a computer
used in interstate commerce or communications, knowingly causes the
transmission of a program, information, code, or command" to a com-
puter without authorization.120 That conduct, when pursued with in-
tent to cause damage or with reckless disregard for the risk of damage,
would violate the CFAA if a certain level of damage or impairment
resulted.121 Second, Congress added a civil cause of action for most
violations of the CFAA.122
The 1996 amendments, adopted as part of the Economic Espio-
nage Act of 1996,123 likewise expanded the reach of the CFAA in two
significant ways. First, Congress discarded the term "[f]ederal interest
computer" in favor of the term "protected computer." The latter term
was significantly broader in scope because it focused on the use of a
target computer "in interstate or foreign commerce or communica-
tion" rather than requiring that two of the computers involved in the
offense be located in different states.124 Under the revised approach,
the CFAA could protect virtually any networked computer, regardless
of whether the offense itself was interstate in nature. Because any
internet-connected computer is used in interstate communication, the
growth in use of the internet worked a corresponding increase in the
CFAA's coverage.
Second, the Economic Espionage Act expanded key substantive
offenses under the CFAA. In prior versions of the statute,
§ 1030(a)(2) covered one who obtained information from financial
records. Congress amended § 1030(a)(2) to cover not only obtaining
information from financial records, but also obtaining information
118 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994)).
119 See supra notes 117, 118 and accompanying text.
120 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act § 290001(b), 108 Stat. at 2097-98.
121 Id.
122 Id. § 290001(d), 108 Stat. at 2098.
123 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1030 (2000)).
124 Id. § 201(4), 110 Stat. at 3493.
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"from any department or agency of the United States" and "informa-
tion from any protected computer if the conduct involved an inter-
state or foreign communication."125 In addition, the amendments
broadened § 1030(a)(5), the provision prohibiting the transmission of
harmful code. The earlier version required that the offense be exe-
cuted "through means of a computer used in interstate commerce or
communications,"126 whereas the new version required only that the
transmission reach a "protected computer."127 As with the other of-
fenses involving a protected computer, the effect of the amendment
was to protect any networked computer, rather than requiring a con-
nection between the computer used in the offense and interstate com-
merce or communication. Congress also added two new offenses for
accessing a computer without authorization and causing damage.128
Five years later, following the attacks of September 11, 2001,
Congress included certain amendments to the CFAA in the USA PA-
TRIOT Act.129 Again Congress expanded the scope of the CFAA,
this time by redefining a "protected computer" to include "a com-
puter located outside the United States that is used in a manner that
affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the
United States."1 3 0 In theory, the specific reference to computers lo-
cated outside the United States would overcome any presumption that
Congress did not intend for the CFAA to have extraterritorial reach.
In addition, by focusing on computers that "affect" interstate com-
merce or communication, rather than computers used in interstate
commerce or communication, the statute could reach as far as the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution permits.131
In summary, over the last three decades, Congress has repeatedly
revisited the scope of the CFAA. Congress has modified or added
125 Id. § 201(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 3492.
126 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act § 290001(b), 108 Stat. at 2097-98.
127 Economic Espionage Act § 201(1)(E), 110 Stat. at 3492.
128 Id.
129 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 814, 115 Stat.
272, 382-83 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. I 2001)).
130 Id. § 814(d), 115 Stat. at 384.
131 Congress has amended the CFAA on three more occasions, making technical changes in
2002, see Criminal Law Technical Amendments Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, §§ 4002(b)(1),
(12), 4005(a)(3), (d)(3), 116 Stat. 1806, 1807-08, 1812-13 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030 (2006)), and enhancing the criminal penalties in 2002 and 2008, see Homeland Security
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 225(g), 116 Stat. 2135, 2158 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)); Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
326, § 204(a)(2), 122 Stat. 3560, 3561-63 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)).
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substantive offenses on a number of occasions. Perhaps more impor-
tant, Congress has extended the statute's coverage to an ever-increas-
ing range of computers. The statute initially covered specific
governmental or financial computers. Although Congress covered
certain interstate offenses in 1986, the fact that interstate computer
networks were not in wide use limited the statute's practical reach.
Congress added a civil cause of action when that reach was still lim-
ited. The extension of the statute's protection to any computer used
in interstate communication, coupled with explosive growth of the in-
ternet, transformed the CFAA. The dramatic expansion of the
CFAA's coverage in part explains the challenge of interpreting the
statute.
With this statutory background in place, the next two Sections
examine how courts should understand the concept of unauthorized
access.
B. Interpreting "Access"
The CFAA does not define what it means to "access[]" a com-
puter. A court considering the term would likely give "access" its
common meaning-for example, "to be able to use, enter, or get near
(something)."132 Dictionary definitions of access in the verb form,
however, are susceptible to two different interpretations. From a
broad view, to access a computer is simply to transmit electronic sig-
nals to it for the computer to process.133 From a narrower view, to
access a computer is to gain entry to it, in the sense of obtaining privi-
leges to use the computer that are not available to the general
public.134
One's understanding of what it means to "access[]" a computer
can have a dramatic effect on the scope of the CFAA. Under the
broad view of access, to transmit any command to a computer (or to
cause a command to be transmitted to a computer) is to access that
computer. For example, when a user sends an email message, the user
"accesses" her outgoing mail server by asking the mail server to trans-
mit a message, she "accesses" the intended recipient's incoming mail
server, and she even "accesses" the recipient's computer. Similarly,
when a user types a URL into a web browser, he "accesses" the do-
main name servers that translate the URL into an Internet Protocol
address and he "accesses" the web server that hosts the web page he is
132 Access, MERRLAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DicriONARY (11th ed. 2003).
133 See Kerr, supra note 10, at 1646-47.
134 See Bellia, supra note 79, at 2253-54.
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seeking. Under this approach, any internet-related transmission be-
gins a chain of events that results in the user's computer "accessing" a
series of networked computers.
Under the narrower approach to "accessing" a computer, only
those transmissions that grant a user the functional equivalent of priv-
ileged entry into a computer system result in a user "accessing" that
system.35 Returning to the email example, sending an email is not
accessing the recipient's computer any more than sending a postcard
accesses the recipient's home. Logging into another user's computer,
and thereby gaining the technical ability to manipulate the computer
in the same way that the user would, would certainly qualify as acces-
sing the computer. Launching the process of contacting a domain
name server to translate a domain name into an Internet Protocol ad-
dress would not constitute accessing the server, but obtaining privi-
leges that would permit one to overwrite a file on the domain name
server would constitute accessing the server.
How should courts choose between these two plausible under-
standings of what it means to "access" a protected computer? The
surrounding text and the statute's history provide some insight. Re-
garding the text of the statute, consider an anomaly that the broader
understanding of "access" creates. As discussed earlier, the current
statute contains certain computer damage provisions. Section
1030(a)(5)(A) prohibits one from "knowingly caus[ing] the transmis-
sion of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of
such conduct, intentionally caus[ing] damage without authorization, to
a protected computer."136  The two subsequent paragraphs,
§ 1030(a)(5)(B) and (C), prohibit "intentionally access[ing] a pro-
tected computer without authorization, and as a result of such con-
duct, recklessly caus[ing] damage"137 and "intentionally access[ing] a
protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such con-
duct, caus[ing] damage and loss."1 3 8 All three of these provisions were
adopted in the 1996 revision of § 1030(a)(5)139 although Congress had
included a version of the provision governing "transmission of a pro-
gram, information, code, or command" in the 1994 amendments.140
135 See id.
136 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (2012).
137 Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B).
138 Id. § 1030(a)(5)(C).
139 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 201, 110 Stat. 3488, 3492.
140 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 290001(b), 108 Stat. 1796, 2097-98 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (1994)).
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If any transmission of a command to a protected computer consti-
tutes "access" to that computer, then the structure of § 1030(a)(5) is
odd. Although each paragraph contains a different scienter require-
ment, if transmitting a command to a computer is equivalent to acces-
sing that computer, Congress could have varied the scienter
requirements but written all three paragraphs to cover "caus[ing] the
transmission of a program, information, code, or command," rather
than covering a transmission in one paragraph and access in the other
two. Likewise, if the concepts of transmission and access were truly
interchangeable, Congress could have written all three paragraphs to
cover "access[ing] a protected computer." Section 1030(a)(5)(A) may
be narrower in theory than the other paragraphs, because it could pre-
sumably cover the conduct of one who has authority to access a com-
puter. Still, because several provisions of § 1030 cover both one who
acts without authorization and one who exceeds authorized access, it
seems unlikely that Congress intended the "caus[ing] the transmis-
sion" language to replicate that concept.
In other words, interpreting "accessing" a computer to mean
merely transmitting a command to the computer creates interpretive
difficulties in § 1030(a)(5). One could argue that the computer dam-
age provisions cannot provide insight into what Congress meant by
"access," since the first version of what is now § 1030(a)(5)(A) ap-
peared in 1994,141 whereas the term "access" was part of the original
1984 statute.1 4 2 Still, the 1994 version of § 1030(a)(5)(A) supplanted a
prior provision that covered "access[ing]" a covered computer without
authorization and thereby altering, damaging, or destroying informa-
tion in it.143 Had Congress equated accessing a computer with causing
transmission of a command to it, it need not have substituted trans-
mission for access. Similarly, because Congress rewrote § 1030(a)(5)
in 1996,1" one can presume that if Congress equated transmissions
causing damage with access causing damage, it would have used the
transmission language throughout all of § 1030(a)(5).
More broadly, the legislative history of the CFAA casts doubt on
a reading of the statute that equates accessing a computer with trans-
mitting a command to it.145 As discussed earlier, when it passed the
141 Id. § 290001(b), 108 Stat. at 2097.
142 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, 98 Stat. 2190 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. II 1985)).
143 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1988).
144 Id. § 1030(a)(5).
145 See Bellia, supra note 79, at 2256-58.
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first version of the computer crime statute in 1984, Congress targeted
a narrow range of computers: those containing national security infor-
mation, those containing financial data, and those operated by or on
behalf of the government.146 The House Report accompanying the
statute emphasized the government's and businesses' growing reliance
on computers, as well as the threat that increased networking would
make society more vulnerable to hacking incidents.1 4 7 Although the
statute covered both those who would access a computer without au-
thorization and those who would abuse authorized access, none of the
computers covered in the statute were available to the general pub-
lic.1 48 The reach of the initial statute, then, is consistent with a concept
of accessing a computer in the sense of privileged entry rather than
mere transmission.
The 1986 statute maintained the three offenses from the original
version of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (with slight modifications), but added
three new ones, two of which were unauthorized-access offenses.149
As noted earlier, both of these new offenses covered unauthorized
access to "[flederal interest computers."150 Although Congress
thereby expanded the CFAA's reach to cover certain interstate of-
fenses, nothing in the debate over the statute's passage indicates that
Congress sought to extend the statute to unauthorized transmissions
to all networked computers.151 Rather, the legislative record empha-
sizes issues of security and confidentiality.1 5 2 The legislative history of
146 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act § 2102, 98 Stat. at
2190-91; see supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
147 See H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 8-12 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689,
3694-97.
148 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act § 2102, 98 Stat. at
2190-91.
149 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2(d), 100 Stat. 1213,
1213-14; see supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
150 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act § 2(d), 100 Stat. at 1213-14.
151 See Bellia, supra note 79, at 2257.
152 Id. at 2257 n.363 (citing 132 CONG. REc. 28,821 (1986) (statement of Rep. Hughes)
(noting that bill was designed to "deter[] the emergence of the computer criminal"); id. (state-
ment of Rep. Wyden) (discussing dangers of hacking); id. at 27,640 (statement of Sen. Trible)
(discussing need to ensure that "our criminal justice system is capable of addressing the types of
offenses that have accompanied the rise of new technologies" and pointing in particular to acts
of "theft, vandalism, and trespass" of computer data); id. at 27,639 (statement of Sen. Thur-
mond) (stating that legislation was designed "to address the real and growing danger of com-
puter crime"); id. at 12,109 (statement of Rep. Rodino) (noting that legislation seeks to deter
"future attempts by high technology criminals in our society"); id. at 7816 (statement of Rep.
Hughes) (stating that legislation targets "the computer sophisticated criminal who combines his
technological skill with old-fashioned greed and criminal intent to rob banks or destroy business
records or steal trade secrets")).
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the 1996 amendments, which adopted the "protected computer" lan-
guage that now prevails in the statute,153 reflects the same concerns.154
In short, the term "access" may have a thus far underappreciated
role in narrowing the CFAA. Nevertheless, one could argue that even
if the term "access" in 1984 or 1986 was properly understood to in-
volve entry into rather than transmission to a computer system, this
was so by virtue of the limitations of the systems rather than the limi-
tations of the term "access." The examples of the "broad" view of
access offered above included transmissions through mail servers and
requests to view particular web pages. The technology involved in the
former example was not in wide use, and the technology involved in
the latter example did not exist, when Congress first introduced the
concept of unauthorized access in 1984. The question of how techno-
logical change should affect the task of statutory interpretation has
complex normative dimensions that are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. For now, it is enough to say that courts construing the CFAA
have neglected the possibility that the term "access" provides a limit-
ing principle for construing the reach of the statute.
C. Interpreting "Without Authorization" or "Exceed[ing]
Authorized Access"
The CFAA does not define what it means to be "without authori-
zation" to access a protected computer. The statute does define "ex-
ceeds authorized access" to mean "to access a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in
the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter."155
The "exceeds authorized access" definition does not illuminate the
concept of "authorization," since it incorporates that term. Courts
have therefore turned to dictionary definitions of "authorization" and
have concluded that to access a computer without authorization is to
153 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 201(4)(A), 110 Stat. 3488, 3493
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (2000)).
154 Bellia, supra note 79, at 2257 n.364 (citing 142 CONG. REc. 27,118 (1996) (remarks of
Sen. Leahy) (stating that act will protect "privacy, security, and reliability of computer net-
works"); id. at 25,910 (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (stating that act will provide "much needed
protection for our Nation's important information infrastructure and help maintain the privacy
of electronic information"); id. at 23,783 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (stating that act will "strengthen
current public law on computer crime and protect the national information infrastructure" and
"protect banks, hospitals, and other information-intensive businesses which maintain sensitive
computer files from those who improperly enter into computer systems"); id. at 23,784 (state-
ment of Sen. Leahy) (arguing that existing statute fell short in protecting "privacy and confiden-
tiality of information")).
155 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012).
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access it without permission or approval or without formal warrant or
sanction.156 To exceed authorized access, then, would be to go beyond
whatever access is permitted or approved.
Even if we understand "authorization" to mean "permission" or
"approval," we still must ask how the owner of a computer system
must convey the limits of that permission or approval in order to trig-
ger the CFAA's protection against unauthorized access. There will be
some situations in which the signal might be direct and unmistaka-
ble-for example, when a system owner specifically revokes an indi-
vidual user's access.157 Part III addresses the separate question of
whether a system owner's consent (or revocation thereof) ought to
dictate the contours of unauthorized access. Assuming that a system
owner's consent does dictate the contours of unauthorized access, and
in the absence of such an explicit signal, the five paradigms described
in Part I appear to reflect different answers to the question of how a
system owner must signal the limits of his or her consent. Under the
agency paradigm, a system owner need not signal which uses of the
system are permissible at all, because an external legal obligation (i.e.,
the duty of loyalty) conveys what is permissible. Likewise, under the
norms-of-access paradigm, a system owner need not convey limits on
the use of the system, because the user ought to know what they are.
The policy and contract paradigms presume that a system owner has a
policy or contract in place delineating the limits of access of the sys-
tem. The difficulty arises when the policy or contract is not clear, or
conflates access and use limitations. Finally, under the code paradigm,
the limits of access are defined by technical boundaries.
In effect, courts applying the different paradigms will accept as
valid different signals of the scope of the owner's consent to use of the
system. Agency principles and norms of access provide a proxy for
the uses to which the system owner would have consented; the policy,
contract, and code-based paradigms signal the uses to which the sys-
tem owner did consent. Each paradigm reflects a different under-
standing of how strong a signal must be before a court treats it as
triggering a user's actual or constructive knowledge of what uses of
the system are permitted or approved.
156 See, e.g., Nosal II, 828 F.3d 865, 875 (9th Cir. 2016); WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v.
Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2012).
157 See Nosal II, 828 F.3d at 871 ("After Nosal became a contractor and Christian and
Jacobson left Korn/Ferry, Korn/Ferry revoked each of their credentials to access Korn/Ferry's
computer system.").
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Assuming that the concept of unauthorized access should be
about the limits of a system owner's consent-a matter on which Part
III casts some doubt-the question still remains: does the CFAA
point to a particular understanding of how a system owner must signal
the limits of his or her permission or approval? Part III explores a
range of policy arguments that support an interpretation requiring
strong signals of the boundaries of a system owner's consent. For
now, it is sufficient to consider how the possible understandings of the
boundaries of authorization align with the possible understandings of
access.
Assume that the broad understanding of access (i.e., that the
transmission of a command to a computer constitutes access) is cor-
rect. Assume also that the CFAA validates a wide range of signals
concerning the limits of a system owner's consent. Under such an ap-
proach, the statute's scienter requirements prove critical. One would
have to read the statute to require that the user intends to act without
authorization or that the user knows or has reason to know that his or
her actions were without authorization. Without a full assessment of
what the user knew or intended, the CFAA could validate all stated or
implied restrictions on use of a system, making the statute breathtak-
ingly broad. Some commentators' discomfort with the breadth of con-
duct the CFAA would reach under this interpretation leads them to
link a broad definition of access with a far narrower definition of au-
thorization.58 Under this approach, accessing a computer without au-
thorization is bypassing a code-based barrier, such as a password
requirement.'59 The CFAA, under this view, is not concerned with all
forms of authorization, but only with a specific type of authoriza-
tion-that is, authentication.
If one adopts a broad view of "access," the narrower approach to
authorization is indeed normatively attractive. As a matter of statu-
tory interpretation, however, it raises two potential difficulties. First,
the term "without authorization" is used not only in connection with
access-related offenses, but also in the computer damage provision.
The premise of the computer damage provision is that one can trans-
mit a harmful command and cause damage "without authorization."160
If we link "authorization" in the access provisions to a concept of au-
thentication, or to meeting the requirements of a similar code-based
barrier, the computer damage provision becomes nonsensical, unless
158 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 10, at 1649.
159 See id.
160 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
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we assign a different meaning of "authorization" for that provision-a
step that would run afoul of principles of statutory interpretation.161
Second, equating authorization with authentication through use of a
"key" (such as a password) to a computer system does not, without
more, reach problematic conduct such as wrongful use of a password.
To reach such conduct, we must incorporate the concept of proper use
of the means authentication: to access a covered computer without
authorization is (among other things) not only to evade a code-based
restriction altogether, but to meet the requirements of the code-based
restriction by improperly obtaining or possessing the equivalent of the
"key." Once we open the concept of acting "without authorization"
to encompass improperly obtaining or using something that facilitates
accessing a covered computer, however, it is unclear why other sorts
of use restrictions do not factor into the authorization. For example,
use of a password to obtain information for personal purposes rather
than business purposes becomes an action without authorization-
possibly rendering redundant the concept of exceeding authorized ac-
cess in the statute.
The narrower understanding of access, as a form of entry rather
than transmission, avoids some of these interpretive difficulties. It
reconciles the use of the phrase "without authorization" in the access
provisions and in the computer damage provisions because it elimi-
nates the need to import code-based restrictions into the concept of
"authorization."162 It also creates distinct liability for accessing a com-
puter without authorization and exceeding one's authorization to ac-
cess a computer. The former applies to one who has no privileges to
enter the restricted areas of a system; the latter applies to one who has
privileges to some areas of a system but not others.
The next Part discusses the normative considerations that point
toward a narrow understanding of unauthorized access, whether that
understanding is based on narrow concepts of "accessing" a computer
or narrow concepts of a lack of authority.
161 See, e.g., Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007)
("[I]dentical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same
meaning.").
162 Cf Nosal II, 828 F.3d at 878 (observing that a provision equating access "without au-
thorization" to access circumventing a technological barrier is "missing from the statutory
language").
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III. RETHINKING UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS: NORMATIVE ISSUES
This Part considers some of the normative implications of the dif-
ferent readings of the CFAA discussed thus far. This discussion ties
back to the statutory interpretation questions, inasmuch as courts in-
corporate some of these normative considerations into canons of stat-
utory construction. Some of the normative considerations, however,
go beyond questions of statutory construction. In other words, even if
Part II's narrow conception of unauthorized access is incorrect, this
Part suggests that Congress should rethink the coverage of the CFAA.
A. Constitutional Concerns
First and most important are the constitutional concerns that
arise from broad interpretations of unauthorized access under the
CFAA. The vast majority of cases construing the CFAA arise in the
civil context, but the same conduct that would be the basis for civil
liability is also the basis for criminal liability. The Constitution re-
quires that criminal statutes speak with sufficient clarity to provide
notice of what conduct is prohibited and to prevent arbitrary or dis-
criminatory enforcement.163 Wherever possible, a court must "con-
strue, not condemn, Congress' enactments."1 64 Part I explored the
range of approaches that courts have taken to determine what it
means to access a computer without or in excess of authorization.165 If
construing unauthorized access to encompass, for example, a violation
of a website's terms of service would render the CFAA unconstitu-
tionally vague, then a court should avoid that construction.16 6 In addi-
tion, the rule of lenity instructs a court facing an ambiguous statute to
choose the construction that favors the defendant.167 Because courts
must construe a statute with both criminal and civil applications con-
sistently across the two contexts, courts apply these canons in civil as
well as criminal cases.
Different paradigms for unauthorized access raise significant
vagueness concerns. When a court treats a policy or a contract as the
basis for liability under the CFAA, it permits private parties to dictate
163 See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402-03 (2010); Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
164 Skilling, 561 U.S. at 403.
165 See supra Part I.
166 Cf United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 464-66 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (overturning misde-
meanor conviction under CFAA after concluding that construing unauthorized access to include
violation of MySpace terms of service would render statute unconstitutionally vague).
167 See, e.g., id. at 463.
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the contours of the statute.168 It is difficult to see how such an ap-
proach gives fair notice of the basis for criminal sanctions. In addi-
tion, the distinction Part I draws between the policy paradigm and the
contract paradigm highlights the fact that courts sometimes do not
carefully consider whether a user knows or has reason to know of the
restrictions on access that a system owner seeks to impose. Interpret-
ing the CFAA to mean that conduct inconsistent with restrictions con-
tained in terms of use, without more, constitutes unauthorized access
would raise significant constitutional concerns. It is more difficult to
say whether the norms-of-access paradigm raises vagueness concerns.
In theory, if a court looks for reasonable expectations or a shared un-
derstanding regarding how technology is to be used, the court is mea-
suring societal expectations rather than conjuring its own view of what
constitutes permissible access. Still, to the extent that access norms
are underdeveloped, interpreting the CFAA to permit reliance on
those norms raises constitutional questions.
As for the agency paradigm, under which a court imports agency
principles to set the boundaries of permissible access under the
CFAA, one could argue that concerns about vagueness are less signifi-
cant because the premise of the agency approach is that an employee
(or other agent) breaches a duty defined by law-albeit one that may
be unconnected to any policy or contract purporting to govern access
to a protected computer. Still, applying an agency theory to questions
of unauthorized access raises significant difficulties. The premise of
the agency approach is that it is easy to distinguish situations in which
the employee is acting in the employer's interest (and thus as a faith-
ful agent) from situations in which the employee is not. Cases like
Citrin, in which the defendant started a competing enterprise, lie at
one extreme.1 6 9 At the other extreme lie a range of activities-using a
computer network to read personal email or to check a Facebook
page, for example-that seem more benign, but that still may not
serve an employer's interest and may even inflict a cost in terms of
lost productivity.170 There is a range of scenarios in between, and it is
difficult to say what factors-the magnitude of the potential loss to
the employer? the employee's intent?-should determine which con-
duct violates the CFAA.
168 See Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA as a Problem of Private
Nondelegation, 127 HARv. L. REV. 751, 768-69 (2013).
169 See Int'l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2006).
170 See, e.g., WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2012).
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These concerns about clarity and the need to construe ambiguous
criminal statutes favorably to the defendant suggest that approaches
under which courts link unauthorized use in the CFAA to policies or
terms of use are inappropriate (at least without a full examination of
issues of notice and assent). These concerns might also suggest that
the norms-of-access and paradigms are also inappropriate.
B. Other Policy Concerns
Assume that each of the paradigms discussed in Part I simply re-
flects a different way for a system owner to signal the limits of his or
her consent to the use of the computer system. Even if the law gener-
ally protects the system owner's ability to use a range of mechanisms
to signal his or her consent, it is not at all clear that the CFAA should
do so.
If authorization under the CFAA is truly about the system
owner's consent to the use of his or her system, the fact that the
CFAA is a criminal statute means that the limits of that consent for
purposes of CFAA liability ought to be conveyed clearly-even if
other areas of the law might not demand the same degree of clarity.
For example, the agency and norms-of-access paradigms aim to iden-
tify the range of uses to which a system owner would consent. By
importing questions about the employee's duty of loyalty, the agency
approach makes liability under the CFAA turn on the employee's in-
tent. In any given case, an employee's motives may be complex and in
flux. The agency approach, in other words, presumes that an em-
ployee's motives will generate clarity about the scope of the em-
ployer's consent, but that may not be the case.
Similarly, norms of access may be unclear or underdeveloped in
some contexts. Indeed, it is not obvious whether a court's inquiry into
unauthorized access under this approach should look to how the sys-
tem owner believes the system ought to be used, or how a reasonable
person thinks the system ought to be used. If the norms-of-access par-
adigm provides no guidance on whose perspective should control, it is
hard to see how it could provide clarity to a user.
There is little question that code-based limits on access generally
provide better notice of the system owner's consent than do other sig-
nals, including policy-based and contractual restrictions. For example,
a user must confront and overcome a code-based limitation in order to
use the system, but he or she will not always encounter policy-based
or contractual limitations when using the system. Moreover, outside
the context of code, signals of a system owner's consent sometimes
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will conflict in ways that complicate the user's understanding of the
scope of permissible access. For example, an employer's policy might
state that employees are not permitted to access the company's com-
puter system for any non-work-related purpose. A widespread work-
place norm that permits incidental use of the system to send personal
email or to monitor one's Twitter feed would conflict with that policy.
Similarly, a user browsing a website may encounter no technical barri-
ers to access. Nevertheless, the website may have a term of use that
purports to restrict certain uses of the information gathered from the
site.
In particular cases, of course, terms of use-or, for that matter,
actual notice through a cease-and-desist letter-may be equally effec-
tive in signaling the limits of the system owner's permission or ap-
proval. And under other legal doctrines, those devices may provide
enforceable limits on the use of a computer system.171 The argument
here is simply that in the context of a federal criminal statute, the law
should require the sort of unambiguous signals of a lack of permission
or approval that code-based restrictions convey.
Note that requiring a system owner seeking the protection of the
CFAA to embed signals about consent into the system's code itself
does not unduly burden the system owner. It is not the case that a
system owner must use code-based restrictions to gain any legal pro-
tection, only that a system owner must do so to gain the protection of
the CFAA. The CFAA is not the only cause of action the employer
can use to seek damages from the disloyal employee. Indeed, in dis-
putes involving alleged misconduct by employees or former employ-
ees, a broad interpretation of the CFAA converts matters of employee
misappropriation and unfair competition into criminal conduct.17 2
Apart from the fact that such an approach permits a system owner to
dictate the contours of the statute, the approach federalizes a range of
disputes that have traditionally been within the purview of state law.
In sum, a code-based approach to the CFAA offers a number of
advantages. First, the signals that it conveys about the system owner's
permitted uses are unmistakable. The same cannot be said for policy-
based or contractual restrictions on the use of the system. Second, a
code-based approach avoids the significant vagueness concerns that
plague broader interpretations of the CFAA. Finally, a code-based
171 For an argument that such mechanisms generally should, outside the context of the
CFAA, provide enforceable limits on the use of a computer system, see Bellia, supra note 79, at
2224-25.
172 See, e.g., United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272, 289 (5th Cir. 2010).
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approach forces system owners to weigh the costs of closing his or her
system. Broad interpretations of the CFAA can have disruptive ef-
fects with respect to computer systems that are otherwise open to the
public. If the CFAA permits a system owner to eliminate any un-
wanted uses of his or her computer system simply by objecting to
them (and thereby rendering access unauthorized for purposes of the
CFAA), the CFAA may displace the balance between access and en-
closure that copyright law strikes.173 The CFAA would thereby permit
a system owner to achieve the benefits of closed access without inter-
nalizing any of the costs of doing so.
CONCLUSION
Courts will continue to struggle with what constitutes unautho-
rized access for purposes of the CFAA. Statutory and technological
changes have repositioned the CFAA as a ready weapon in commer-
cial disputes involving access to computer systems or use of informa-
tion those systems contain. Careful construction of the statute should
lead courts to a narrower conception of unauthorized access than that
which many courts have adopted to date. In particular, a code-based
approach is truer to the text and history of the statute and aligns with
a range of normative concerns.
There are, of course, various forms of misconduct that would es-
cape the reach of the CFAA under a code-based interpretation. The
law addresses matters such as the theft of trade secrets and misappro-
priation of information in various ways; a narrow interpretation of the
CFAA still preserves a number of legal avenues for those harmed by
alleged misuse of a computer system, while avoiding constitutional
and policy pitfalls.
173 See Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. REv. 320,
323 (2004).
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